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J. RODNEY JOHNSON

The Absence of Due Process
in Fiduciary Accounting
A Constitutional Concem
Introduction. Once upon a time the content of a legal notice posted on the courthouse door was likely to become a
matter of community knowledge within a reasonable period of
time. Today, however, few persons would seriously suggest
that courthouse posting satisfies minimum due process requirements for notice to parties of a proceeding affecting their property rights. Yet this is the only form of notice that Virginia law
provides for beneficiaries when their fiduciaries make accountings before the commissioner of accounts. And, topping this,
there is no provision for any form of notice to beneficiaries
when the commissioner reports to the court on the fiduciaries'
accountings. Accordingly, this article argues that Virginia's
present fiduciary accounting notice provision, Code § 26-27,
is patently unconstitutional and that it should be replaced in
an orderly fashion before a judicial decision to that effect casts
our fiduciary administration system into disarray. Legislative
proposals are appended to this article that will largely, though
not perfectly, resolve these problems without imposing a time,
substance, or economic burden on any party. Although Code
§ 26-27 deals with the accounts of personal representatives,
guardians, curators, committees, and trustees, this article will
focus on only one of these groups - testamentary trustees in order to facilitate a presentation of the issues.
Accountings by a testamentary trustee. Testamentary trustees are required to make annual settlements of their accounts
before the commissioner of accounts. 1 These accountings typically contain a chronological recitation of all receipts, expenses
and distributions during the accounting period, which may be
broken down into different subcategories in some cases. During the settlement process a beneficiary has the right to appear
before the commissioner and "insist upon· or object to anything which could be insisted upon or objected to by him ... if
the commissioner were acting under an order of a court of chancery for the settlement thereof, made in a suit to which he ... was
a party."2 Unlike the highly formalized, court-oriented procedures in many other jurisdictions, Virginia's approach is intended to provide a more informal, ''user-friendly" procedure
before the commissioner. Indeed, the Manual for Commissioners ofAccounts states that"( o)ne strength of the Commissioner
system is informal resolution without the beneficiary being
required to hire counsel."3 Following the commissioner's settlement of the trustee's account, the commissioner is required to
file a report thereon in the circuit court clerk's office, along
with "any matters specially stated deemed pertinent by the
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commissioner, or which may be required by any person interested to be so stated."4 The commissioner's report lies in the
clerk's office for a period of 15 days during which a beneficiary
11

may file exceptions thereto in another simplified procedure. 5
If no exceptions are filed within this 15-day period, the
commissioner's report is automatically confirmed. 6 Following
this automatic confirmation the commissioner's report "shall
be taken to be correct, except so far as it may, in a suit in proper
time, be surcharged or falsified." 7
Consequences of the settlement process. Judge Lamb sums
up the net result of this settlement procedure as follows "The effect of an account regularly stated, followed by [automatic] confirmation, is protection for the fiduciary from any
assault except by the difficult suit to surcharge and falsify.
Such accounts are 'prima taciecorrect.'" 8 Harrison joins Lamb
in this characterization of the suit to surcharge and falsify as
being a "difficult"procedure,9 and the Virginia Supreme Court
has "expressly held that the ex parte settlements of the commissioner of accounts are presumed to be correct until surcharged and falsified, and not only the duty of specifying errors, but also the onus probandi devolves on the party complaining."10 Moreover, the complaining party is unable to obtain a review of the entire account that has been settled ex
parte because "'the inquiry is limited to particular items alleged to have been improperly included or omitted, and in all
other respects the account is left to stand as it is. "' 11
The problem presented. Although a beneficiary is given
two opportunities to participate in a "user-friendly" account
settlement process before being relegated to the "difficult"
procedure of a suit to surcharge and falsify, there is no provision in Virginia law requiring anyone to give the beneficiary
notice of either opportunity. The only provision for notice
about the pending settlement of the trustee's account is found
in Code § 26~27, which merely (i) requires the commissioner
to post on the courthouse door a list of the fiduciaries whose
accounts are before him for settlement, and (ii) prohibits the
commissioner from completing an account until 10 days after
such posting. In this regard, the Manual for Commissioners of
Accounts recognizes that "(t)his posting procedure is clearly
an anachronism from the 19th century when the Commissioner
system was established. In rural 19th-century Virginia, citizens
regularly visited the courthouse to transact business and may
have paid some attention to the notices posted." 12 Such cannot
be said today, and thus the Manual concludes that "(f)or the
system to work, the Commissioners must notify those interested."13
However, there is no duty upon the commissioner to give
any notice other than the courthouse posting required by § 2627, and there is no duty upon the trustee of a testamentary trust
to give beneficiaries any notice at all. 14 Thus a known beneficiary of a testamentary trust, whose whereabouts are also known,
(i) has no right to receive notice calculated to advise the beneficiary of the pending settlement of the trustee's account in
the commissioner's office, and (ii) has no right to receive any
notice of any kind, not even by posting, of the commissioner's
report being filed with the court and the beginning of the 15day period for filing objections before the commissioner's report is automatically confirmed.
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The constitutional context. Although there are later cases,
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 15 is the U.S.
Supreme Court's landmark decision dealing with due process
in fiduciary accountings. Mullane arose in the context of a
bank, serving as trustee of a common trust fund, making a
judicial settlement of its trust accounts based upon notice to
beneficiaries by newspaper publication pursuant to New York
law. In responding to the claim that this newspaper notice was
constitutionally insufficient under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court noted that

Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and
abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there
can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation of ... property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. 16
The lack of notice to beneficiaries in Virginia fiduciary accounting effectively deprives them of the opportunity to participate in either (i) the "user-friendly" settlement procedure
before the commissioner, or (ii) the relatively simple remedy of
filing exceptions to the commissioner's report. The property
interests of such a beneficiary are negatively impacted in several ways as a consequence of this lack of notice. First, the
beneficiary's property interest in the trust is subjected to some
diminution by the costs associated with the settlement procedure, in which lack of notice precluded participation. 17 Second, the beneficiary has lost the opportunity to protect his
property interests in the expedient and "user-friendly" settlement procedure before the commissioner (as well as the opportunity to file exceptions to the commissioner's report), and
must now attempt to protect his property interests in the "difficult" suit to surcharge and falsify where the commissioner's
report is prima tacie correct and the beneficiary bears the burden of proof in establishing the contrary. 18 Third, the beneficiary must now expend additional funds to retain counsel to
prosecute the suit to surcharge and falsify in order to have any
remedy, whereas a remedy without the necessity of counsel or
expenses of a suit existed in the commissioner's office. And
fourth, the complainant in a suit to surcharge and falsify is
unable to obtain a review of the entire account that has been
settled ex parte because "'the inquiry is limited to particular
items alleged to have been improperly included or omitted,
and in all other respects the account is left to stand as it is. "' 19
The foregoing, which is not meant to be exhaustive, should be
sufficient to establish that a beneficiary does experience a deprivation or diminution of property in these cases.
After discussing the general unreliability of newspaper publication to give notice, but recognizing that in some instances
newspaper publication was the only method realistically available, the Court in Mullane went on to hold that it did not meet
minimum due process requirements in that case, and further
stated that
(w)here the names and post office addresses of those
affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to
apprise them of its pendency. The trustee has on its
books the names and addresses of the income benefiTHE VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL

ciaries represented by appellant, and we find no tenable ground for dispensing with a serious effort to
inform them personally of the accounting, at least by
ordinary mail to the record addresses. 20
The Mullane case can be factually distinguished from the
case under consideration in insignificant ways, but the two
cases are the same in substance. In the context of the present
case, the applicability of the Mullane logic and reasoning cannot be denied vis-a-vis the diminution of the beneficiary's property interest, the ease with which the trustee and the commissioner may give notice to those whose addresses are known,
and the consequent right of the beneficiary to receive notice
by a method no less certain than ordinary mail. 21
Responses to the problem in Virginia. The issue of notice
in fiduciary accounting has come before three groups in Virginia during the past decade. The responses made by these
groups are reported in the following paragraphs.
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Tulsa
Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 22 which was based
upon the Mullane rationale, The Virginia Bar Association's
Section on Wills, Trusts, and Estates became concerned about
the impact of these two cases upon the probate process and
fiduciary notice in Virginia. This concern led to numerous discussions by the Section that culminated in a document identifying a number of constitutional deficiencies in Virginia estates and trusts law, two of which are the subject-matter of this
article - fiduciary accountings to the commissioner of accounts and the commissioner's report to the court. 23
Another group whose members' professional lives cause
them to be constantly examining issues such as those raised
herein are the faculty members at Virginia's six law schools
who teach in the estates and trusts field. In August 1996, the
following inquiry was sent to a faculty member teaching in the
field of estates and trusts at each of Virginia's six law schools:
In regard to the constitutional sufficiency of Virginia
Code § 26-27's provision for notice to beneficiaries
in accounting proceedings, I (do) (do not) [please circle
your choice] believe that this section satisfies the due
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment
when applied to known beneficiaries whose whereabouts are also known.
All of the addressees responded to this inquiry, and each one
circled "do not."24
The Judicial Council of Virginia established a Standing
Committee on Commissioners of Accounts in January 1993,
and gave the Committee six charges, one of which was to make
a continuous review of the statutes relating to fiduciaries. The
issue of notice in fiduciary accountings came before the Standing Committee in the fall of 1996, while it was considering the
legislative proposals it would seek to have introduced in the
1997 Session. Following a lengthy discussion of the issue, a
motion was made to determine whether or not the Standing
Committee was in favor of giving any notice, without regard to
how that notice might be satisfied. The members present were
equally divided on this issue and thus the motion failed on a
tie vote. Putting the constitutional issues aside, this vote is
FALL 1997

particularly difficult to understand in the light of the Standing
Committee's statement in its own Manual that "(f)or the system to work, the Commissioners must notify those interested. "25
Conclusion. In regard to the need for remedial legislation to
resolve the within-described problems, it is submitted that the
affirmative opinions (i) contained in the Report of The Virginia Bar Association's Section on Wills, Trusts, and Estates,
(ii) of all of the surveyed law professors who teach in the field
of estates and trusts in Virginia, and (iii) of a significant number of the Standing Committee on Commissioners of Accounts,
corroborate the arguments made in this article, and collectively
all of the foregoing mandate a legislative response.
As noted at the outset, this article's discussion focuses on
the rights of a beneficiary of a testamentary trust for purposes
of convenience. However, it requires little imagination to see
that the foregoing arguments also apply to accountings of personal representatives, guardians, curators, committees and, effective January 1, 1998, conservators for incapacitated persons. Thus the proposed statute that is appended to the article
deals with all of these fiduciaries.
In the absence of a legislative resolution of the issues raised
herein, it is only a question of time before a case raising them
comes before the courts. One such case did go to the Virginia
Supreme Court in 1995, but the Court was able to decide it
without reaching the constitutional questions. 26 These issues
may be reached in the next case, however, with the potential of
throwing Virginia's fiduciary accounting system into turmoil.
Therefore, until such time as appropriate legislation issues from
the General Assembly, the prudent fiduciary (and commissioner?) may wish to consider voluntarily giving the notices
suggested herein. An interested party cannot claim to have
been denied procedural due process by § 26-27 if that party
was given actual knowledge of the proceeding in question.
A postscript concerning inventories. It is further submitted
that a parallel provision should be added to the Code requiring
fiduciaries to give mailed notice to beneficiaries when they
file inventories of their estates with the commissioner of accounts. Although none of the foregoing constitutional arguments are applicable to inventory filing, many good reasons
for giving this notice do exist, such as fiduciary disclosure,
"sunshine," and protection of the common good. The person
filing the inventory stands in a fiduciary relationship to those
who own the estate and elementary principles of fiduciary disclosure suggest that the owners ought to be advised of the
content of their estate and the value placed thereon by their
fiduciary. From a "sunshine" standpoint, there are obvious incentives to a fiduciary's full disclosure of all of the assets in an
estate, and their more accurate valuation, if the fiduciary must
send a copy of the inventory to parties who are likely to have
knowledge about this property. From the standpoint of protecting the common good, those who receive a copy of an
inventory that is defective in content or valuation are in a
position to bring the problem to the attention of the commissioner who otherwise would normally approve the defective
inventory without a realization of its deficiencies.
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PROPOSED LEGISLATION
NEW § 26-27.1. Written notice of filing inventories and accountings to be provided to certain parties. - Every
fiduciary filing an inventory or accounting with the commissioner of accounts shall give notice thereof by first class mail
(A) in connection with a decedent's estate, to those persons who were entitled to notice from the fiduciary pursuant
to § 64.1-122.2, except that notice to heirs shall not be required in a testate matter;
(B) in connection with a testamentary trust, to all beneficiaries who are or, in the exercise of the trustee's discretion,
may be entitled to any present distribution of income or principal;
(C) in connection with a minor's estate, to those individuals who would be the minor's heirs ifthe minor were to die
on the date that notice is given; and
(D) in connection with an adult incapacitated person's estate, to any known agent under a durable power of attorney
or, in there is no such agent or if the fiduciary is also such agent, to those individuals who would be the incapacitated
person's heirs ifthe person were to die on the date that notice is given.
(E) Notwithstanding the provisions of clauses (B), (C) and (D), notice need not be given to (i) an incapacitated person
if notice is given to his fiduciary, (ii) any minor for whom no guardian has been appointed, if notice is provided to his
parent or person standing in loco parentis, (iii) any unborn or unascertained persons, and (iv) any person who has waived
the right to notice hereunder.
(F) Forms for the notice required by this section, which shall contain appropriate instructions concerning their use,
shall be prepared by the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court and shall provide for the attachment of a
copy of the inventory or accounting (not including any supporting documents) thereto. Such forms shall be furnished to
each clerk of court, who shall provide copies thereof to every fiduciary who qualifies in the clerk's office.
(G) No commissioner of accounts shall approve any inventory or accounting
(1) until twenty-one days have elapsed from the receipt thereof, and
(2) unless the inventory or accounting contains a statement that the notice required by this section (i) has
been given, and shows the names and addresses of those to whom it was given, (ii) has been waived, or
(iii) cannot be given due to the inability of the fiduciary, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, to
determine the name and address of any person to whom notice is required.

§ 26-32. Where filed; notice to interested parties. -The commissioner shall file the report in the office of the court by
which he is appointed, as soon as practicable after its completion. On or before the date ofsuch filing the commissioner
shall mail or deliver a copy of the report to eveiy person who was given notice of the accounting pursuant to § 26-27.1.
§ 26-14. Commissioners to inspect and file inventories with clerks; notice to interested parties. - The commissioner
shall inspect all inventories returned to him by fiduciaries, see that they are in proper form, and, within ten days after they
are respectively received and approved by him, deliver them to the clerk of the court, to be recorded as required by law. On
or before the date ofsuch delivery, the commissioner shall mail or deliver a copy ofthe inventoiy to eveiyperson who was
given notice ofits filing pursuant to § 26-27.1.
§ 26-27. Commissioners to post list of fiduciaries whose accounts are before them for settlement. - Repealed.

Although a fiduciary's inventory becomes a public record
after the commissioner approves it and lodges it with the clerk
of court, and an interested party can obtain a copy upon becoming aware of the filing, the question to be answered is
"What purpose is being accomplished, or public policy served,
by making the interested parties wait until this time before
they are entitled to any notice; particularly when the later one
discovers an error the more difficult it is to rectify that error in
many cases?" It certainly cannot be said that notice is unnecessary because the commissioner is protecting the interests of the
parties, because the commissioner's approval is "of the form of
the inventory only."27
The proposed legislation. The first of the above three statues, new § 26-27.1, deals with notice to interested parties of
the filing of inventories and accountings before the commissioner. 28 Paragraph (A) of new§ 26-27.l focuses on notice by
personal representatives, and parallels the provisions presently
found in § 64.1-122.2, that establishes the notice of probate
that they must give. Simplicity is obtained by providing that
14

the persons who are entitled to receive notice of inventory and
accounting are the same persons to whom the personal representative has already sent notice of probate - persons whose
names and addresses are already in the fiduciary's files. The
only burden placed upon the personal representative will be
photocopying and mailing a copy of the accounting to these
same persons.
The remainder of new§ 26-27.1 deals with the other fiduciaries who are required to account. For purposes of clarity, the
rule for each kind of fiduciary is set forth in a separate paragraph. Again, in each of these cases, the identity of the persons
entitled to notice will normally be known and the only burden
placed upon the fiduciary will be photocopying and mailing.
The remaining proposals are simply amendments to § 2632, which requires the commissioner to file account reports
with the clerk of court, and § 26-14, which requires the commissioner to deliver approved inventories to the clerk of court.
The notice requirement created by the amendments to these
sections simply requires the commissioner to give mailed noTHE VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL

tice to persons whose names and addresses have already been
provided by the fiduciary. 29 This will not impose any substantive burden upon the commissioner of accounts, but it will
satisfy the beneficiaries' rights to due process.
ENDNOTES
1. fa Code§ 26-17.6.
2. WI. Code§ 26-29.
3. MANuAL FOR COMMISSIONERS OF ACCOUNTS, 1 6.1, p. 32
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15. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
16. Mullane,at313.
17. The Supreme Court found two deprivations of property in
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to one [In Virginia replace "one" with "the commissioner of accounts."]
who, in their names but without their knowledge, may conduct a fruitless oruncompensatory contest [In Virginia replace "contest" with "accounting."] Mullane, at 313.
18. Also arising in this connection is the issue of the trustee's compensation, the claim for which may be excessive from the beneficiary's
standpoint. This is of particular importance because, as the Court noted
in Mullane, "it is their [the beneficiaries] caretaker [the trustee] who in
the accounting becomes their adversary." Ibid, at 316. If a beneficiary
objects to the trustee's claimed compensation before the commissioner,
the burden will be upon the trustee to prove the reasonableness of the
claim. But if the objection can only be made in a suit to surcharge and
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courthouse door but without further notice to beneficiaries. WI. Code
§ 26-17 [§ 26-27]. Once the Commissioner makes his report to the
circuit court it will stand confirmed unless exceptions are filed within
fifteen days. WI. Code§ 26-33."
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Michigan resident acting as the legal representative of two minor heirs,
maintained that the "limited notice afforded by posting as provided in
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report of the commissioner of accounts in violation of the due process
clause." Opinion, p. 2. However, the Supreme Court responded that
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violation of her due process rights. Even though the order recited that
appellant's pleading was untimely because it was filed more than 15
days after the commissioner's report was filed, the order shows that the
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them." Ibid
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"(s)ome commissioners attach a disclaimer to the inventory in order to
insure that interested persons will understand that the commissioner's
approval of the inventory is only as to its form. Language used by one
commissioner is 'The Commissioner of Accounts has not independently verified the value of the items on this inventory or the fact that
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28. This statute was drafted in the Legislative Subcommittee of the
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action on this proposal due to its decision to not go forward with any
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Subcommittee.
29. A further amendment not proposed herein, but which may be
desirable, is a lengthening of the period the commissioner's report lies in
the clerk's office before automatic confirmation from the present 15
days to a more traditional, and perhaps more reasonable, 21 days.
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